Abstract
The doctrine of consideration is one of the most fiercely debated aspects of the law of contract in Common Law jurisdictions. Consideration emerged during the sixteenth century as an element of actions in assumpsit (breach of promise or undertaking). It has suffered criticism from judges and academics alike. But despite its controversial status, it remains an essential requirement for the formation of contracts not in deed form. From time immemorial, the common law has clearly provided that a promise by a party to perform an act that he or she is already legally bound to perform is not good consideration. Accordingly, a promise received in exchange is not enforceable. This is so whether the promise would have the effect of creating a new contract or modifying the terms of an existing contract. The rule has from time to time been the subject of judicial criticism but nevertheless operated with full vigor until 1991. Hitherto, (except in unilateral contract situations) consideration subsisted in the promises made by the parties at the instant of exchange rendering the promises thenceforth mutually enforceable. The contract or the modified contract effectively existed from that time, unconcerned with what the parties hoped to gain from the exchange or what each in fact gained. The focus of this article is the re-examination of the rule on adequacy of consideration in contracts.
Keywords: Contract, Offer, Acceptance, Consideration, Adequacy